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The scandals that engulfed Wall Street involving large public corpora-
tions, like Enron and WorldCom, and leading professional financial ser-
vices organizations engaged in accounting and securities research, such as
Arthur Andersen and Merrill Lynch have led to “a full blown corporate
governance shock” amid the collapse of the once booming United
States stock market (Washington Post 2002).
This market decline and focus on corporate and professional mis-
conduct call to mind a similar emphasis on “good corporate gover-
nance” made in the context of the financial crisis in East Asia in the late
1990s. Indeed, the turmoil in Wall Street may be seen as supporting the
While the current turmoil in global finance seems to support calls for
“transparency,” “accountability,” and “professionalization,” closer analy-
sis reveals disjunctures in the dominant discourse on corporate gover-
nance, whose central element is the promotion of “investor confidence”
and “shareholder value.” This essay draws on the theoretical work of
Pierre Bourdieu and Stuart Hall to examine how representations of the
stock market and securities research in the Philippines regularize par-
ticular interests, identities, relations, and hierarchies in the global politi-
cal economy. But it also shows how these representations reveal
underlying tensions in the discourse that open up spaces for
rearticulating and reordering financial governance.
KEYWORDS: globalization, corporate governance, stock markets, securi-
ties research, professionals
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global discourse of  “transparency,” “accountability,” and “profession-
alization.” However, a critical analysis may show how this crisis reveals
the disjunctures or contradictions in the dominant discourse on cor-
porate governance, as articulated, for example, by the OECD and the
World Bank.
This discourse is centered on the argument that, in the context of
financial globalization, the goal is to promote investor confidence and
shareholder value. This objective is seen to be achieved if financial prac-
tices and institutions in emerging markets, such as those in the Philip-
pines and East Asia, are reshaped along the lines of the “mature
markets,” particularly according to what is assumed to be the most ad-
vanced of  them all, American financial markets (Tolosa 2001). Indeed,
prior to the scandals that have prompted calls for regulatory reforms
and tighter governance of  the U.S. capital markets, Wade (2000) noted
the double standard in the discourse of transparency and accountabil-
ity. He said
most of what the G7 and IMF and allied bodies have acted on so
far—as distinct from merely talked about—is related to subjecting
the governments, banks and firms of  emerging market countries to
the tighter discipline wanted by private international capital markets,
rather than subjecting those international capital markets or the G7
countries to tighter discipline. (Ibid., 148–49)
In the wake of  the scandals, the debate in the U.S. on the nature
and extent of  regulatory reform shows how “good corporate gover-
nance,” which has privileged U.S. financial practices and institutions,
can become contested. One view—held by the Bush administration and
its business and political allies—sees the scandals as “more a case of a
few bad apples, not a fundamentally deformed tree.” The other view
considers “the steady stream of corporate failures as symptoms of
broad systemic problems.” A New York Times writer said the debate
reveals a “philosophical difference about the role of government and
its relationship to the marketplace” (Labaton 2002).
What are the conditions of possibility for the production and con-
testation of a particular common sense of financial governance? Under-
lying the nature and extent of  corporate and regulatory reform is the
larger question of the meaning and relations of accountability in global
financial governance. Who is being called to account, by whom, and to
what end? How does a particular story of  “transparency,” “accountabil-
ity,” or “professionalization” come to construct social hierarchies in the
global political economy wherein actors and institutions are differentially
empowered and deemed capable of  gathering information, interpreting
and deploying them so that others can be monitored, held responsible,
and disciplined if so warranted? What are the tensions and contradic-
tions in the discourse that can provide spaces for alternative accounts
and social relations of political-economic accountability? These are the
questions raised by a critical constructivist reading of the production of
global financial governance which I seek to provide in this essay.
The Stock Market as a Field of Symbolic Power
and Securities Research as Symbolic Labor
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of  doxa provides a way to conceptualize and
analyze global governance in terms of  the structuring and structured
effects of knowledgeable practices (Ashley 1989). While the field of
doxa is a world where “things go without saying because they come
without saying” (Bourdieu 1977), its self-evident, natural character is not
given but actively constituted in knowledgeable practices that have a
habitual (or unspoken) and strategic character. There is always the pos-
sibility that the ambiguous field of  doxa could lose its necessary, apo-
litical character when its arbitrary and constructed quality is exposed,
and thus its unquestioned doxic or symbolic power is lost.
Bourdieu has produced a whole body of empirical and theoretical
work on the construction of symbolic power in partially autonomous
“fields”—structured spaces of positions and relations shaped by the dis-
tribution of specific resources or “capital” among those in the field. He
argues that this type of power is not based on words per se but in the
“belief in the legitimacy of the words” of the speaker who utters
them (Bourdieu in Swartz 1997, 88). Although it is rooted in material
forms of  capital (economic, cultural, or social), these are transformed
into an invisible form of  symbolic capital whose power lies precisely
in its not being recognized as such (Thompson 1991). Its arbitrary and
interested character is “misrecognized” as disinterested and thus legiti-
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mate by those who are subjected to it. The production of symbolic
power is therefore about the struggle over the production of  common
sense, legitimate naming, and indeed “world making” (Bourdieu 1989).
Key to this process of the production of doxic power is symbolic
labor. This is carried out by specialized symbolic or cultural producers
(intellectuals and professionals in particular fields, who are at once
dominated and dominant) “by transforming relations of  interest into
disinterested meanings and by legitimating arbitrary relations of
power as the natural order of  things” (Swartz 1997, 93). In Bourdieu’s
analysis, this form of  production is crucial to social regularization or
normalization.
Drawing on Bourdieu’s insights, the stock market may be conceived
as a field with historical relations among subject positions rooted in
certain types of  resources or forms of  capital and power. It has rela-
tive autonomy from other fields; it has its own values and regulative
principles of production, evaluation, and exchange. While a field is a
“patterned system of  objective forces,” it is at the same time also a
“space of  conflict and competition” where agents struggle with one
another—often with the shape and divisions of the field itself at stake
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 17–18). It has its own professionals or
symbolic laborers (e.g., accountants and research analysts) who have
both lasting and transposable dispositions or “habitus” internalized from
their socialization and training, and who are at the center of the often
contradictory and hybrid practices of symbolic production, that partly
arise from the tensions of their own social identities and positions as
“dominated dominant” (ibid., 192); or what Bourdieu has also ex-
pressed as a subject position on the “dominated pole of the field of
power” (i.e., a relative position among the powerful).
In the case of emerging markets, financial globalization and gover-
nance are linked with the entry of foreign portfolio capital and invest-
ment houses from “mature markets” which are associated with practices
such as securities research. The rapid growth of stock markets amid
capital account liberalization in emerging markets like the Philippines in
the 1990s indeed has been accompanied by the emergence and
increased prominence of research departments, with their highly paid
managers, directors, economists, strategists and analysts, particularly those
in foreign-owned investment houses and stock brokerages. But what is
crucial is the representation of the growth of securities research as sig-
nifying a shift in the nature of  the securities industry, from one driven
by gossip and inside information to one that is founded on “improved
information and a rigorous assessment of  risk” (IMF 1998, 6), and
thus more characteristic of  developed financial markets. Transparency
and professional analytical capacity are seen precisely as essential features
of private or marketized regulation and corporate governance in the
context of globalized and “mature” finance.
Securities Research as a Signifying Practice:
The Work of Representation in Financial Regularization
Securities research is not a neutral or “scientific” informational practice
performed by professionals, but is itself  a discourse, a structured ter-
rain of signifying practices, that is mutually constitutive of the social
meanings and relations of “good corporate governance” and of global
financial regularization. It is deployed as a symbol to classify or create
social distinctions among actors and practices within the stock market
field itself and among corporations and economies that are made
transparent and accountable in the broader political economy.
I draw on Stuart Hall’s (1988) work to understand securities research
as a signifying practice. His insights on the work of representation as
involving processes of articulation and identification help illuminate the
analysis of global financial regularization. Hall (1996a, 141) uses the
term “articulation” to mean a “connection that can make a unity of
two different elements, under certain conditions . . . a linkage which is
not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time.” Thus,
sociopolitical struggles are “over how particular practices are positioned,
into what structures of meaning and power, into what correspon-
dences they are articulated” (Grossberg 1996, 156).
Part of the analytical task is to study how securities research is
represented in the field of the stock market and beyond it, to what
specific discourses and webs of meaning it is attached, and how it is
appropriated and employed as a cultural or symbolic device, as much
as a financial tool, to categorize particular sites, actors and practices, and
PHILIPPINE STUDIES 52, no. 1 (2004) TOLOSA / STOCK MARKET AND SECURITIES RESEARCH8 9
encode them with social meanings and distinctions. In the articulation of
securities research practice with wider discursive formations, identities
are also produced and socially positioned—within the research commu-
nity, the securities industry, and more broadly in the national and global
political economy. These social identities and subject-positions are them-
selves the result of a social suture, a temporary point of intersection,
attachment and identification (Hall 1996b). Thus we can also ask how
stock market actors (especially research analysts) socially imagine and
invest in the particular identities and positions to which they are sum-
moned, within specific historical moments, institutional sites and politi-
cal-economic strategies. It is in these complex articulations or suturing
processes and effects that we can understand the conditions of possi-
bility for global financial regularization.
But, as Hall stresses, such articulations are never complete or final. It
is therefore critical to view these processes as sites of conflicts, contra-
dictions and contestations. The articulation of  social meanings and
identities is an arena of appropriation, accommodation, resistance and
struggle, involving various forms of  identification and differentiation,
inclusion and exclusion, speaking and silencing, domination and subor-
dination. Processes of articulation and identification are mutually consti-
tutive of social hierarchies at many levels which, because of their
discursively constructed character, are not fixed or completely stable,
and thus also open to challenges.
The representations of the stock market and securities research in the
Philippines thus can be used as a window to view not only the consti-
tution of the dominant discourse of corporate governance and global
financial regularization, but also to identify the spaces for a rearticulation
and reordering of these financial mechanisms of calling to account.
The Philippine Stock Market
as a Site of Global Financial Regularization
This essay takes the Philippine stock market as a site in the field of
global finance and examines the contemporary process of financial
regularization and symbolic production at work in this particular
geographic and sociopolitical space. My analysis is based on in-depth
interviews I conducted from February to July 1998 with more than
eighty informants across the industry—the majority of  whom were se-
curities research analysts, but also included other actors in the equities
market. My field research took place at an opportune time for study-
ing representations of the stock market precisely because it was done
during a moment of  crisis. There was a perceived failure of  financial
governance and many saw the need to rethink habitual ways of con-
ceiving and doing things in the industry, including securities research.
Research analysts were grappling with their assumptions and analytical
models. They were concerned about job security and career options.
They became conscious of practices and relations that they had taken
for granted. As Lincoln (1994) has noted, mechanisms of authority-pro-
duction become more manifest during crises of  authority. Thus, the
common sense of the securities field and the processes of global
financial regularization also become apparent and open to proble-
matization, as their tensions and conflicts are revealed even to the actors
who are participant in them.
In studying these actors’ representations of the securities field, par-
ticular attention is given to the classificatory schemes which they deploy
to make sense of the world in which they are located, particularly in
the context of the boom and collapse of emerging stock markets like
the Philippines in the 1990s. Such systems of  classification, often based
on a binary logic of inclusion and exclusion, are at the heart of sym-
bolic production, as Bourdieu has argued, borrowing a key insight of
French structuralism. But these binary distinctions are not only logical or
conceptual. They are at once also social and political discriminations and
thus both express and produce hierarchies among the dominant and
dominated in particular fields. For Bourdieu (1984, 479), therefore, the
production of  symbolic power is embedded in classificatory struggles
which are productive of  social meanings, groups, and positions.
Bourdieu has also said that classificatory struggles are not only
based on and constitutive of  social interests. They are struggles over the
very identities of those who are both subjected by and/or who subject
others to such symbolic representations and classificatory schemes.
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[W]hat individuals and groups invest in the particular meaning they
give to common classificatory systems by the use they make of
them is infinitely more than their “interest” in the usual sense of the
term; it is their whole social being, everything which defines their
own idea of themselves, the primordial, tacit contract whereby they
define “us” as opposed to “them,” “other people,” and which is the
basis of the exclusions (“not for the likes of us”) and inclusions
they perform among the characteristics produced by the common
classificatory system. (Ibid.)
These distinctions are also articulated with one another or with
broader discourses and classifications to position themselves and others
within the field and sometimes beyond it. Research analysts formed a
majority of  my informants; at the center of  their representations was
securities research itself, and how particular types of practices, actors
and spaces may be socially distinguished and positioned in terms of  it.
It is in this sense that securities research may also be understood as a
discourse—a structured terrain of  symbolic or signifying practices.
For example, the discursive constructions of  “present/future,” “for-
eign/global” which they have articulated with “research expertise,” “eco-
nomic advancement and maturity,” and “good governance” point to
the subjectivities of  global institutional investors and Western (especially
the U.S.) financial markets and services that are not directly visible in the
site of my primary field research, but are the ever-present privileged
“other” in the representations of  my informants, and thus constitutive
of their own social identities and subject positions in global finance.
The site of the Philippine stock market itself provides a window to
this production of identity and difference, inclusion and exclusion, in a
field that is at once local and global.
Representations of the Past and Present, Local and Global,
and the Articulation of Hierarchies in the Stock Market
Although the history of the stock market in the Philippines can be
traced as far back as the late 1920s, my informants considered the rel-
evant period for studying the industry as beginning only in the late
1980s and even the 1990s. One reason often given for such a view
was that, prior to the late 1980s, the listed companies consisted largely
of  speculative mining and oil exploration ventures. It was only in the
late 1980s and 1990s that commercial-industrial issues began to domi-
nate stock trades. But, more significantly for my informants, this period
was associated with the entry of foreign institutional investors and in-
vestment houses/brokerages, and thus with the Philippines joining the
global ranks of  “emerging markets.”
Thus, one very prominent form of  articulation is that which links
“past” with “local,” and “present” with “foreign” or “global,” in terms
of  both actors and practices. Moreover, past-local and present-global
are discursively constituted through a further articulation with the “qual-
ity” or “sophistication” of securities research and the extent of
“professionalization” in the industry. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing typical observation from an expatriate research analyst who joined
the local industry in the 1990s:
When I arrived, the Philippine stock market was driven by gossip. It
was driven by who knew what and who knew whom, rather than
any attempt to assess whether a company was fundamentally cheap
or fundamentally expensive. It was almost irrelevant. People didn’t
even seem to know how to come to a conclusion on that question.
Whereas now, which is probably a reflection of  the fact that there are a lot
more foreign brokers in Manila than there were five years ago, the gossip
side of it still drives the market to an extent, but it tends to drive
the smaller stocks, whereas the bigger stocks are far more driven by some
fundamental attempt to understand what they’re worth. And the attempt to
understand what they’re worth is quite sophisticated. (Emphasis added)
Analytical “sophistication” is defined in the analysts’ community in
terms of  the latest quantitative valuation models and techniques being
used in New York or London. A Filipino head of  research for a
medium-sized local brokerage claims that “prior to 1986, nobody even
knew what a P/E [ratio] was.” He adds that, with the entry of  foreign
investors and brokers, “we now had to adopt ways of looking at the
stock market the way they do: P/Es, cash flows, balance sheet analy-
sis—lahat (the works).” A managing director for an Asian brokerage
says Filipino securities analysts in the 1990s took short-term crash
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courses in investment analysis. He proudly notes: “Our securities analysts
can now easily relate with fund managers anywhere—London, New
York. They now communicate in and speak the same language” (emphasis
added).
A managing director for a European investment house contrasts the
time in the early 1980s, when he entered the stock market in its “in-
fancy,” with the late 1990s. In the past, he says, what were required
were “street smarts” rather than people with formal training to handle
the market. When he joined the industry, experience was the more im-
portant requirement. The research he did at that time, he says, “was
nothing complicated—what was involved was market talk and simple
analysis.” But “when the bigger houses came in, the demands changed
dramatically. Things became more technical. They became less depen-
dent on what you learn in the street than what you learn from books.”
Now, he says, the people they hire are “rocket scientists.” A former
senior analyst for another European house, in responding to a query if
securities analysis has become a profession in the Philippines, says:
“Definitely. In the past you only had to be guwapo (good-looking). You
had to be a good salesman.” According to him, it did not require too
much analysis to sell a stock then. Now, there is a constant demand for
new valuation methods. One has to be a step ahead of  investor clients
who are also steeped in analytical methods.
What is evident in these representations I have described is the way
a certain kind of securities research and those who practice or sub-
scribe to it are articulated with notions of sophistication and progress
in financial markets and services. Furthermore, these conceptions are
also linked to notions of “foreign” or “global” entities, actors and
practices, with the implication that these are the relevant models that
need to be emulated, whose “language” needs to be spoken, whose
concerns need to be addressed, and from whose perspectives “local”
institutions need to be constructed if the latter are to grow and “mature.”
These binaries and their articulations are mutually constitutive of the
social distinctions in the field, and the way social identities and practices
are positioned in the struggles over financial regularization, in this par-
ticular site and beyond it. These distinctions express and produce social
hierarchies on both buy and sell sides of the field which include
locating those subjects whose positions are in the intermediate levels of
the discursively constructed discriminations.
A senior analyst who does research on the Philippine market from
an overseas base but was in the country during my fieldwork believes
“locals have grown as a function of the foreigners being here, because
it is foreign money that makes the price move. So you have to under-
stand how foreigners think, and from that you learn.” Brokers are ac-
credited and funds are coursed through them on the basis of points
and rankings given by fund managers according to several criteria, but
with the biggest weight given to research (around 70–80 percent). Thus,
analysts say one of  their goals is to be “ranked” in regular surveys of
global fund managers’ opinions of  brokers, whether internal surveys or
those conducted and published annually by financial magazines such as
Institutional Investor, Asiamoney, and Euromoney.1
By contrast, the image that is presented of the “locally driven”
stock market of the past is one in which speculative traders or “punt-
ers” dominated the industry and who required little if any securities
research. Investment decisions were made on the basis of insider access,
advance information, anticipation of  money flows, and market rumors.
The same overseas-based Filipino analyst quoted earlier puts it this way:
The stock exchange has been traditionally an “old boys’ network.”
What was needed in order to make money was to be in on the
tsismis (gossip or rumors). Most brokers were engaged in proprietary
trading. What was needed were a few salesmen and some analysts,
but little real analysis was done.
The head of research of a local brokerage portrays research prior to
the entry of  foreign institutional investors as based on “Daw Theory.2
Aakyat daw. (Someone said it will go up.)” Thus, this local brokers’ joke
(which I caught only when I realized that he was giving me a Filipino
language answer to a question I had posed in English) expresses in
Filipino bilingual humor the widespread notion that the local stock
market was primarily rumor-driven rather than research-driven. It was
part of the task of research analysts to verify whether these stories
were true or not. According to the research analysts who serve the
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local market, what is of interest to their clients are direct, actionable,
trading ideas and story lines rather than valuation models. But one for-
eign-based broker, who used to analyze the local market, says that the
difference between the current situation and the past is that, while locals
are still story-driven (“who is buying what”), they also ask for funda-
mental reasons (“what do they see in the company”). The implication is
that even the rumor-driven locals are not immune from the influence
of the research-driven foreigners through sheer exposure.
An even more recent development than the entry of foreign port-
folio funds and houses has been the arrival of foreign or “expat” re-
search analysts into the Philippine equities industry, beginning in the
mid-1990s, when business revenues as well as the salary costs of top
local analysts had reached levels prevailing within the region to justify
the hiring of  expats in cost-benefit terms. Interestingly, some Filipino
informants tend to see the expats in terms of  contributions to sales
rather than in terms of  contributions to research or substantive analy-
sis per se. Such representations point to the tensions and struggles
within the field that, on one hand, construct the “global” as superior to
the “local” but, on the other hand, also attempt to carve out a privi-
leged space for those locals whose identities are articulated with “so-
phisticated” research in “globally oriented” and “professionally run”
brokerage houses. Thus, expat analysts are viewed as “marketing tools”
who help to communicate and present research products to foreign
fund managers in a language and manner they understand, and thus
impress potential clients and raise foreign business volume. As one Fili-
pino stock market veteran puts it, “Filipinos are good in crunching
numbers but weak in communicating ideas.”
While the traditional belief is that the surplus of local professionals
and the Filipinos’ relatively good command of English make the hiring
of expats less necessary in the Philippines than in other places in East
and Southeast Asia, local securities actors also say it gives houses a com-
petitive edge in the global market to have “whites” and “British ac-
cents” speaking for them. One expat head of research seems to concur
with this general notion about the expats’ contributions to the sales side
of the business, but takes it a step further when he says “hard-hitting
directness is more natural to Westerners than Filipinos.” He believes
Westerners are better at going on marketing or conference calls, speak-
ing in public, or taking the risk of being criticized or shot down. He
says “Filipinos are getting better at it” but “it is against the natural
grain.” If there is any weakness he sees among his Filipino analysts,
it is in the marketing side of  the business. By contrast, he considers it
the greatest strength of  Westerners. While made matter-of-factly and
even sympathetically vis-à-vis his Filipino staff, this expat’s observation
reveals that the local-global binary is also embedded in a broad and
deep discourse of  national-cultural-racial hierarchy, which both the
expats and the locals assume and articulate, and within which they
position themselves.
Expats have also been represented as providing a more regional or
global outlook in analysis because of their experience in overseas mar-
kets. In the aftermath of  the financial crisis which hit the region in
1997, such a global perspective has become even more highly valued.
One Filipino equity sales representative, who has lived for some years
abroad, says that “while many Filipino analysts are talented, they are so
myopic,” by which she means the lack of  foreign experience makes
many local analysts prone to studying the Philippine economy, stock
market and companies in isolation from the rest of the world and
even the region. An expat analyst for a foreign investment house ob-
serves that global clients want to speak with analysts with broad back-
grounds, training, and experiences. Unfortunately, he says, the Philippine
industry is so small and recruits only from select elite local universities,
such that Filipino analysts tend to have homogenous social, academic
and professional backgrounds. Western analysts, he notes, usually come
from a wider variety of backgrounds, aside from having had experi-
ences in advanced markets. The privileging of  expat subjectivities can
also be seen in the way their practices are articulated with “more so-
phisticated” valuation tools and other securities research techniques and
methodologies used in the advanced markets. That is the reason why,
some informants say, expats have often been asked to train local
analysts.
But, as noted earlier, these articulations are not without tensions or
free from some forms of  contestation. Consequently, a number of  Fili-
pino analysts in foreign houses tend to downplay the expats’ claim to
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expertise by pointing out that these advanced techniques of securities
analysis can be learned from finance books. But the local analysts’
struggle against the expats’ presumed superior subject position is done
without questioning the broader doxa that development means the
closer articulation and response of the local market to the demands
and needs of global finance, particularly through sophisticated research.
In fact, what they are arguing even through their resistance is that local
analysts are in a better position to effect this linkage than the expats
who, like them, are also analyzing the Philippine market for foreign
investors. The local analysts, they say, have more extensive experience
and contacts in, and a superior “reading” of or “feel” for, the local
situation, which ultimately is what global investors need. The locals are
thus, in this view, more effective cultural intermediaries or translators of
the Philippine market for the foreign institutional investors. These local
analysts say there is no point hiring expats to analyze the Philippine
market, especially because the expats get paid in hard-earned dollars.
The local analysts therefore can effect cost savings for their foreign
employers.
Interestingly, some local analysts have resented the “arrogance” of
some expats who, they perceive, think of  Filipinos as inferior. In the
same breath, however, these local analysts, in questioning the abilities of
their expat colleagues, reproduce the very global-local hierarchy they
resent by commenting that the expat analysts who are in the Philippines
are probably not the best in the field because otherwise they would be
working in New York or London, not in Manila.
The financial crisis in 1997 has only heightened the subordination of
local to global subjectivities. Because of  the way the crisis unfolded, and
particularly because of the way foreign fund managers allocate invest-
ment funds (i.e., on a regional basis), analysts believe that they now
have to adopt a much more regional and even global approach to
analysis than previously. But this is also partly because cost-benefit con-
siderations have led foreign houses to the conclusion that an in-depth
focus on country stocks is no longer justified in a situation where indi-
vidual country markets have shrunk. What has happened is a “stream-
lining” of brokerage operations that often means the relocation of
research functions and, in some cases, entire houses to regional centers.
But even for country and company analysts who have been retained,
the situation is interpreted to mean that investors no longer want to
look at Philippine companies on a stand-alone basis, but in light of
comparable companies in similar industries within the region. In effect,
fewer analysts are being asked to study more companies within the
same sector and/or region. The need to cover foreign markets has
given more premium to analysts with overseas experience and training;
they are more likely to be expats or based outside the Philippines.
While some analysts have expressed apprehension over less demand
for Filipino analysts as a whole in the wake of the crisis, at the same
time the senior Filipino analysts among my informants also believe that
the crisis has given a greater premium to “quality” analysis which can
reinforce their privileged position in the field. What fund managers are
now interested in are more accurate ways of measuring troubled com-
panies. Thus, the even more savvy and demanding global investor be-
comes much more closely articulated with sophisticated research and
experienced analysts.
Rearticulation of the Sales-Research Distinction
and the Hybrid Doxa of the Field
We have seen how expat analysts are discursively privileged; they play a
crucial sales or marketing function in securing the much sought after in-
vestments of the global institutional clientele. This issue leads to a critical
topic regarding the dichotomy between research and sales, and how
the actors and practices associated with them are differentially consti-
tuted and empowered through the articulation and rearticulation of this
binary with the past-present and local-global distinctions.
According to my informants, securities research in stock brokerages
is traditionally viewed as a “cost center,” a staff  function that is subor-
dinate to the revenue-generating function of  equity sales. The division
of labor, as a salesperson puts it, is as follows: research specializes in
“product knowledge”—writing reports and making stock recommen-
dations; sales takes care of “client knowledge”—cultivating close rela-
tionships with clients and paying attention to their investment needs and
strategies and to the overall sentiment and money flows in the market.
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In this perspective, analysts regularly provide research input to sales-
people but, because it is the sales unit that deals directly with the clients
and brings in business volume, it is considered as the “profit center.”
Salespeople are the ones who most visibly generate commission revenue
and are thus compensated for it.
Research analysts, especially those from foreign houses, have increas-
ingly challenged this demarcation of  roles and implied lines of  authority.
They see this model as dating back to a time when the securities indus-
try was “relationships-driven” rather than “research-driven.” What we
are seeing, they argue, is a blurring of the lines that traditionally separate
research from sales. This development is seen as the result of  the clients
themselves becoming more analytically sophisticated so that it is not
sufficient for them to rely on relationships established with salespeople.
They need to talk directly with specialist research analysts to get in-
depth information about companies, markets and economies, often
evaluating the very models and worksheets used by analysts. The big
funds are set up so that they have their own analysts to verify research
reports from the brokerages. Fund managers, according to an expat
analyst, are “not content with the salesperson blustering about on the
surface. They need to get in-depth [analysis] to add any value to their
own work. So if  they’re looking for added value, the research person
is now the guy that can do it.” He says this is the “Western style” of
securities research practice, wherein analysts take on both research and
sales functions.
Rather than being viewed as a staff function that feeds ideas to the
sales department, research is now considered as the center that not only
creates the product that is sold to clients but also does the marketing
of that product, because analysts are the ones who are seen to possess
the kind of  knowledge necessary to sell the stock ideas effectively. The
implication is that the traditional sales route is increasingly bypassed, and
the stereotypical “stupid salesperson” who only “parrots” research ideas
becomes a dying breed.
The “present-global-research” articulation is thus further linked with
“marketing” but in a manner that privileges “research-driven” rather
than “relationships-driven” equities sales. As a veteran head of  sales says,
salespeople are then forced to become “more analytical,” and, as the
managing director with the self-described “street smarts” background
puts it, to “hit the books.” But the head of  research for a foreign
house also says that in advanced markets sales departments now only
serve as “distribution and execution channels.” And even this role is
undermined by the growth of  electronic stock sales and distribution.
This blurring of roles, however, also means that research analysts are
also expected to become more “sales-driven” and “market aware.” An
expat head of  research says: “We can’t be just sort of  professorial
types sitting in some ivory tower.” A managing director of  a foreign
brokerage firm points out that, when he wants to hire somebody for
research, he not only looks for analytical abilities but also presentation
and marketing skills. Writing a research report is only half  of  the
analyst’s work. The other half  involves marketing that report to clients.
Another head of research for a foreign house says what is crucial is
not the research per se but the ability to communicate that research and
get the market to act on it. A junior analyst laid off during the 1997
financial crisis observes: “While it is necessary for you to have all this
knowledge about valuation . . . at the end of  the day, the idea gets
sold by people who are motivated, who take the extra mile to bring
their clients out. It is as much an intellectual game as it is a game of
public relations.” A former head of  office, who is considered among
the pioneers in setting up research departments in the late 1980s, notes
that, ironically, because analysts also have to take on a sales function,
what often becomes emphasized and demanded are not (just) their ana-
lytical skills but (also) their relationship skills. They all agree that “fund
managers are treated like kings” in the industry. Analysts of  the present,
like the salespeople of the past, are expected to know the special needs
and wants of their clients and should tailor their research ideas and ap-
proaches accordingly.
What is at the heart of this contradictory articulation of research and
sales is the hybrid doxa of the stock market and the processes of
symbolic production in the field within which securities research as a
particular form of  symbolic labor is implicated. Thus, even the privileg-
ing of research and its articulation with analytical sophistication
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and professionalization are embedded in a larger doxa and habitus
where the bottom-line is revenue-generation. In a real sense, securities
research is subordinated to profit-making and is ultimately judged by
whether or not it brings in flows of investment, revenues, fees, and
commissions.
For full service investment houses, the emphasis on revenue-genera-
tion is not viewed solely from a secondary market perspective. In fact
for such investment houses, the main source of income is not from the
secondary brokerage business, but from the primary investment banking
or corporate finance business. Thus houses make huge investments in
high-priced, top-ranked analysts because of their ability to attract cor-
porate finance clients. According to a sales representative who has also
worked in research, the high-profile marketing efforts of some research
analysts (which include exposure in the business media) are geared not
only toward potential institutional clients on the equities side, but also to
potential corporate clients on the investment banking side.
There are these Chinese walls between equities and corporate fi-
nance, but if  you are high profile, of  course the corporates will say,
“oh this analyst is always quoted in the market, he is known in the
market, everyone follows him. So if I give my IPO to this com-
pany, it will be easier for them to sell it, and therefore it will also
command a better price.”
One of the important tasks of analysts, the head of research for a
foreign investment house believes, is to identify potential corporate fi-
nance opportunities and clients for the house. Analysts have close rela-
tionships with corporate managers and have the deepest knowledge of
these companies’ prospects. Thus, several informants note that “Chinese
walls” are often porous, with analysts providing research input to both
sides of  the business. This situation raises issues of  conflict of  interest
because analysts’ research and stock recommendations are believed to
be compromised when their own investment houses have a huge stake
in selling the corporate stocks which the houses have underwritten. This
conflict becomes particularly stark during times of crisis or bearish
markets. As another head of  research for a full-service investment
house observes:
If the broking side is dead, you have to look at the investment
banking side to provide the business. So it may not be a direct
thing, but in your mind you know that you have to find someone
to support your high salary and bonus. This is not only in the case
of  the Philippines. This conflict of  interest is present even in ad-
vanced markets.
Thus, the symbolic labor of securities research cannot be separated
from these conflict of interest dynamics which are at the heart of the
global finance doxa.
“Fundamentals” or “Superficials”?
Contradictions on the “Buy Side”
Although my informants associated the entry of  foreign portfolio inves-
tors and investment houses in the 1990s with the rise to prominence
and importance of securities research in the Philippine stock market—
particularly the use of  rigorous valuation tools to determine market and
company “fundamentals”—they also admitted that, because these
developments took place during a bull market, many investors were
making huge profits on the basis of sheer “liquidity” or “money
flows.” Thus, while both brokers and investors ostensibly based their
investment recommendations and decisions on “fundamental analysis,” it
was in practice often difficult to separate this approach from the
“story-telling” that aimed to capitalize on the positive regional sentiment
that prevailed in the early to mid-1990s. Their objective was to capture
prospective brokerage clients who were already eager to bring their
funds to Southeast Asia.
This contradiction surfaced when I asked my informants how critical
research was to their operations. A managing director of  a foreign in-
vestment house replied that it was very important; their clients (mostly
foreign institutional investors) ranked houses and allocated business vol-
ume primarily on the basis of research output. Thus, emphasis on
research and expertise was articulated with “sophisticated” (and mostly
foreign) investors. But during the interview, he also said: “Frankly, what
drives our market are flows, nothing else, pure flows,” which was
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inconsistent with the supposed research-driven orientation and strategy
of  their clients.
In the 1990s, an expat head of research says, the Philippines was a
relatively new market to foreign fund managers:
So people didn’t know a great deal about the market. They were very
reliant on people on the ground for information and any kind of information
would do. It obviously helped also that 1993 was a phenomenal bull
market, and the Philippines was the third best performing stock
market in the world. So you could get people to buy stocks, anything could
get people to buy. You could say, “Well, I think it’s going to go up,” and that
would get people to buy . . . 3 (Emphasis added)
An overseas-based analyst notes it was very easy to move a thin
market. “One could buy anything and it would move up. There was
analysis, but it wasn’t so much quality analysis as the ability to spin a
story that investors buy into.”
My informants generally articulate the emphasis on “stories” and
“money flows” with local retail and institutional investors who are rep-
resented as relying on good relationships with their brokers to be able
to monitor and anticipate the movement of foreign funds, rather than
basing their decisions on fundamental research. But it seems that for-
eign institutional investors have not been immune from relying on
sentiment, flows, and stories. A long-time Philippine stock market prac-
titioner says:
Even sophisticated investors think like retail investors. Foreign institutional in-
vestors act in groups because they are assessed relative to their compe-
tition. They do not want to lag behind others. They follow one
another. They exchange information. And you would be surprised at how
gullible they can be. (Emphasis added)
This statement clearly introduces a contradiction in the dominant dis-
course because it removes the assumed distinction between sophisti-
cated-institutional-foreign investors and unsophisticated-retail-local
investors (or “traders”). The global institutional investors are seen as
being as much driven by sentiment and the bandwagon as the latter.
Thus, the discursive binary between “gossip”/”stories” and “fundamen-
tal” research also becomes problematic, with serious implications on the
socially constructed identities of research analysts and how they are
positioned relative to other actors in the industry (e.g., salespeople who
specialize in “relationships” rather than “knowledge”) and among them-
selves (e.g., in terms of  who are the “high quality” as opposed to “low
quality” analysts).
Earlier, I discussed the contradictory construction of globally-oriented
research analysts as market-aware and market-oriented and how such
articulation both privileges and subordinates them in the dominant dis-
course of  profit-making. One way to get a glimpse of  this tension is
to view the representations of top-rated analysts in the Philippine stock
market of  the 1990s. One analyst particularly stands out because of  the
strong opinions field actors have of him, both positive and negative.
An admiring managing director says of him:
He capitalized on market psychology. He knew that most funds were
like herds—they moved together. In order to create that situation, he
knew he had to have a strong following—those who would follow him blindly.
He capitalized on this in order to create momentum, to get stocks
moving. If  you’re a fund manager, and you see stocks moving , you would
conclude that he must be right. (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, a more critical senior analyst also says:
Foreign institutional investors knew that his stories needed to be
discounted by 20–25 percent but still bought the stocks that he
recommended. The locals knew the foreigners would follow him.
Foreigners assumed the locals would also follow. People knew the story
was incorrect but no one wanted to be left out. That was how one made
money. This is also a function of how fund managers are evaluated
(i.e., by relative performance). One cannot afford to miss the boat.
But hands down, he was probably the best story-teller in the industry ever.
Even though you know that the stories he tells are lopsided, grudg-
ingly you have to say that he pulls in the investment, which makes it even
more frustrating for those of  us who are trying to build a different way of
doing the business. It’s frustrating because you work so hard at getting
things right rather than just telling a good story. You want to be able
to tell a good story, but you want to be able to tell the true story. And then
in the face of that, people will invest in him whom they know is patently
wrong. It gets very frustrating. (Emphasis added)
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It is interesting to see what Institutional Investor itself said of this star
analyst, during the year when his unit was named to the “first team” of
its annual “All-Asia Research Team” by a wide margin. First, the maga-
zine said the foreign investors were “delighted” when four stocks he
recommended “outpaced the market by some 70 percent.” Second, the
survey noted that in a “cliquish market” he is “further valued for his
ties with corporate and government leaders”—his “very good reach
into boardrooms and other high places” as one unnamed foreign inves-
tor put it.4
What is important about these narratives, whether admiring or criti-
cal, is less what they say about this particular research analyst per se,
than what they reveal about the profit-making doxa of the field and
the practices of “research-driven” global institutional investors who
apparently would welcome “stories” from “high places.” They will not
hesitate to reward their brokers and analysts with huge business vol-
umes and high survey ratings, as long as their bottom lines are pro-
tected by following the research recommendations that they in fact can
help make self-fulfilling through their sheer size relative to the market.
One former analyst says that one of  his main problems and biggest
frustrations is with the investment horizon of  clients. “The biggest
funds say that they have a three to five-year view. In reality, they are
traders. Because fund managers are evaluated every quarter, it is neces-
sary for them to act like traders.” A veteran equities market profes-
sional, who has worked both in research and brokerage management,
has also made a statement that is inconsistent with the usual articulations
of  “foreign institutions” with the “long-term,” and of  “local retail
punters” with the “short-term”:
Global investment styles are evolving rapidly to a point where mo-
mentum and volume are taking 40 to 70 percent of stock direction.
This was only 20 to 40 percent in the 1980s. Fund managers are
becoming even more short-term oriented. In the 1980s, the long
term was 5 to 20 years and there were no hedge funds. Now the
long term is 1 to 3 years.
The implication is that research analysts are increasingly under pressure
from their clients to write reports and make recommendations with a
short-term investment horizon, which are bound to be based more on
market “flows” or “sentiment” than “fundamentals.”
The initial response of many analysts in the Philippines (whether local
or expat) both in foreign and locally-owned brokerages to the onset
of  the crisis in 1997 was to try to differentiate the Philippine economy,
stock market, and listed companies from those hardest hit in the re-
gion. This analytical approach came under heavy criticism from institu-
tional investors, and was eventually accepted by many of my
informants in 1998 as representing their failure to adopt a “regional” or
“global” perspective in their research. When I asked an expat head of
research about this kind of criticism, he replied:
When we said [Philippine banks were] “not too bad” we thought
that for the big banks which we cover, the sort of top 15 listed
banks, non-performing loans will not get so bad that there will be
any erosion to book value . . . I think banks are in reasonable shape
. . . and they look pretty cheap on that basis. So that was basically
what we said. The only problem with that, all of which I think was right
fundamentally, was when we initially said that, the timing was wrong. . . .
That’s another thing about markets. When things are going up, ev-
erybody is like leap-frogging each other upwards to be the most
bullish person. . . . Here and in Asia, in general, post the crisis, there was
massive leap-frogging downwards. Everybody couldn’t wait to be the most bear-
ish person out there. . . . There was this macho competition to be the
most bearish analyst. . . . And we were saying, “the Philippines is just not
that bad.” But partly colored by the fact that our clients also look at
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea where non-performing
loans are going to be significantly higher than here, they’re going,
“We don’t believe you. You are not bearish enough. You are not
being realistic.” . . . So we did get a bit of criticism which I think was a
little bit unfair. It was really just our fault perhaps for not understanding the
strength of sentiment rather than anything else. (Emphasis added)
Note that there are overlapping discourses in the above statement.
On the one hand, my informant underscores his adherence to funda-
mental analysis which he understands and accepts as the global standard
for high quality securities research. That is why he thinks it was “un-
fair” that his research unit’s report was criticized by clients. At the same
PHILIPPINE STUDIES 52, no. 1 (2004) TOLOSA / STOCK MARKET AND SECURITIES RESEARCH26 27
time, he admits to a shortcoming “for not understanding the strength
of  sentiment” and for “wrong timing.” But in making these statements,
he voices what amounts to an alternative construction of stock markets
and of supposedly sophisticated institutional investors as being prone to
excesses, swings in sentiment, and tendencies toward “leap-frogging”—
whether on the bullish or bearish side.5
The crucial issue is not a lack of  transparency, available information
or research capacity in emerging markets per se. What is critical is that
the socially shared parameters, rules and stakes of the competitive
game, or what Bourdieu simply calls the doxa of the field, encourage
strategic myopia among stock market players, particularly the global
institutional investors, whose subject positions in the field are defined
according to taken-for-granted standards of  relative short-term perfor-
mance (the illusio of the actors in this field).
Part of the irony of the situation in which securities analysts find
themselves is that, during a bull market when investors are euphoric,
there is really less demand for “quality” analysis because “everything is
going up, everything is a ‘buy’” as one of  my informants puts it. In-
vestors are looking for “stories” that would confirm the positive sen-
timent and create further excitement. Analysts’ salaries are going up and
they are considered “stars” because their forecasts take on a self-fulfill-
ing quality as stock prices are carried by momentum. By contrast, dur-
ing a bear market when clients become more skeptical and
demanding, and when analysts are challenged to become more rigorous
and creative in their analyses, there is little interest in the market. As one
stock market veteran has observed of  analysts in 1998: “Nobody lis-
tens to these guys now.” Or as a relatively junior securities analyst, laid
off from a foreign house during the crisis, has said of analysts’ pre-
dicament in a bad market: “You can’t convince anyone. Anything you
print is going to waste.”
Thus, it is debatable whether the existence of  “Western” standards of
accounting, transparency, and prudential regulation in emerging markets
would have changed the way institutional investors acted in the 1990s—
both during the boom and the crisis. Indeed, the relatively recent man-
date from fund managers to research analysts to focus on corporate
balance sheets means that they knew where to get information on debt
exposure if this was a major concern to them and if it figured as a
central component of  their risk valuations prior to the crisis. Appar-
ently, the problem is one of  “selective perception rather than imperfect
information” (Griffith-Jones and Pfaffenzeller 1998; Wade and
Veneroso 1998). One of  my analyst informants notes that the call for
“greater transparency” is actually a double-edged sword for foreign
investors because “the reason they are here in the first place is because
of  market inefficiency . . . they can make larger returns.” On the issue
of prudential regulations, one expat head of research makes this reveal-
ing comment regarding the criticism of the Philippine stock market as
being an “old boys’ club”:
For us, the big ones, the big foreign brokers, these are all pretty
much irrelevant apart from the fact that just possibly, foreign insti-
tutions would rather invest in a country which is up to Western
standards in terms of  protection against conflicts of  interest and
things that run on the right guidelines. But to be honest, there’s not one
foreign firm that has ever mentioned to me or asked me a question about the
regulation of  the market and whether I think it’s ethical, which is quite inter-
esting. I think they are just more concerned about making money. I think
that if  they felt that they were really getting legged over, really get-
ting the raw end of the deal, then it might be an issue. But al-
though I personally think that to some extent that is the case, in
some stocks, some of  the time, I just don’t think that it is a big
enough issue. It’s not like it’s a real tin pot for organizations. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, one could very well reverse the argument and say that, if there
is a need for prudential regulation, it should be of institutional investors
from advanced markets as much as, if not more than, corporations
and other actors and institutions in emerging markets (see Fitzgerald
1998).
Tensions and Dilemmas on the “Sell Side”
While the literature on the capital flows to emerging markets in the
1990s argues that “push” factors were more important in determining
the total volume of portfolio flows from institutional investors, the
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literature also notes that “pull” factors were significant in affecting the
distribution of flows to individual country stock markets (see Haley
1999; Manzocchi 1999). In this sense one can understand the view
among my informants in the brokerages or those on the “sell side” of
the Philippine stock market that, as mediators of these flows, it was
critical for them to be able to “speak the language” (i.e., of fundamen-
tal research) of  foreign institutional investors. Thus, locally-based research
analysts respond as symbolic laborers to the perceived needs of global
clients and act as cultural intermediaries between the global investors
and the local economy/corporate sector—as translators and spokesper-
sons. As one member of  a top-ranked research team from one of  the
foreign houses that entered the Philippine market in the early 1990s
describes their unique role at that time:
Because foreign fund managers knew little about the Philippines and
in fact were not looking at the country as a place to invest, we
made it our crusade to educate them, to change their perception of
the Philippines—that we were in Asia, not in Latin America—by pro-
viding them more details, more angles. We gave them true blue re-
search, good quality research. So they have to take you seriously,
and they remember the Philippines.
But as noted earlier, even though my informants generally do not
find this problematic, there is a real tension between the representation
of securities research as “professional, independent and rigorous analy-
sis,” and its articulation as “market-oriented” or “sales-driven” to be
considered as a “profit center” rather than as a “cost-center” within its
own house. This tension can be seen in the frequent articulation of
“top analyst” with “excellent communication, presentation, and market-
ing skills” that effectively blurs the line between research and sales. As I
have noted, it was in their supposed contributions to the “marketing”
of stocks that the hiring of expats over local research analysts was
often justified.
One informant who was among the first Filipino professionals to
set up a research unit for a foreign house in the 1980s says that the
main tendency for analysts is to be optimistic or to think of the busi-
ness environment as safe for investors. The implicit mandate to market
equities or to convince potential clients to “buy” stocks often makes the
call to “sell” a “dreaded word” in the business.
Moreover, because it is important for analysts to maintain ready ac-
cess to the corporations they analyze, which are their main sources of
research data, they are careful not to antagonize company managers
who may take “sell” recommendations personally and blacklist them.
As a head of research for a top foreign house has said, analysts often
use euphemisms like “long-term buy,” “speculative buy,” or “hold” to
avoid recommending an outright “sell.” So when analysts really mean a
“buy,” they say “strong buy.” The research director justifies the practice:
“It doesn’t hurt your relationship with the corporations, but it also gives
a semblance of  independence when you present it to your investors.”
A former analyst, highly rated in his industry in the mid-1990s,
recalls:
It takes guts to call a “sell.” The president of the company will call
you himself. They take a “sell” recommendation personally because
many are family-owned companies or because officers have stocks
in the companies they manage. So their net worth is directly af-
fected by a “sell” call.
Another kind of pressure on securities analysts to provide favorable
research reports comes from corporate finance departments in big full
service investment houses. These units are concerned with maintaining
good relationships with corporations so that the house can generate
revenue through “primary business” or investment banking deals (e.g.,
initial public offerings, debt offerings, and mergers and acquisitions)
which usually provide much larger fees than brokerage commissions or
revenues from the “secondary business.” One former analyst, whose
previous house aggressively pursued investment banking deals, remem-
bers the time when she called a “sell” on a company. This company
immediately rang up her firm’s corporate finance department to say,
“no more deals,” which in turn got back to her to say, “you’ve just
lost business for us.” This pressure is particularly strong if  the house is
already committed to undertake the capital offerings or mergers and
acquisitions of  a company, in which case the brokerage unit effectively
becomes a distribution arm of  the equities being sold in the market. A
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junior analyst, who used to work for a foreign investment house which
was engaged in many underwriting projects, reveals:
When your house has too many relationships to take care of, they
impede the kind of  work that analysts can do. There are things you
want to say but can’t say because the corporate finance side is nur-
turing relationships. There were companies I really hated, but I couldn’t say
anything bad. You have to temper everything. And it is worse when you are
forced to say the opposite of  what you really want to say. You can give out
all the information but you always highlight what is good and gloss
over the negatives. (Emphasis added)
He adds that the problem is compounded because those in corpo-
rate finance often have seniority in the firm or have a bigger represen-
tation in top management. Thus, junior analysts are unable to resist
pressure. He claims that, in over half of the “buy” reports issued by
the house he worked for, the analysts themselves were not in favor of
the recommendation. A senior analyst makes a similar point: “In the
big houses, you can tell based on how analysts write extremely bullish
reports which companies they have investment banking deals with.”
Every deal is often huge and immediately quantifiable and results in
banking revenues that in theory can pay the salaries and bonuses of the
entire research unit for a year.
But the paradox is: Why are the big full service foreign houses al-
ways ranked at the top of  yearly surveys of  fund managers if  there
are doubts about the independence of their analyses? One answer I
received is that it is not necessarily the analysis per se that results in high
ratings, but often the quickness with which the houses are able to get
and convey corporate information to their clients who are then able to
act in a timely manner in the market. This easy access to information
results from the close relationship between the listed companies and the
investment houses that have helped raise money for these corporations.
The narrative above implicitly raises the issue not only of the objec-
tivity of  securities research but also its overall quality. This problem has
often been attributed to the “immature” nature of  emerging markets.
In an article titled “Impaired Intelligence,” the magazine Euromoney dis-
parages Asian equity research from Bombay to Bangkok:
Investors in Asian equities have learnt the hard way that the
stocks they purchase often bear little resemblance to the stories they
are sold. This is by no means unique to Asia, and as the markets
mature, disclosure will no doubt improve. But it might improve
sooner, critics say, were brokers’ research better . . .
There are several reasons why Asia, more than most regions,
needs unbiased research. In North America and Europe, the regula-
tory framework generally ensures a high degree of  transparency. In
Asia, by contrast, the rules seem constantly to be trying to catch up
with the infractions. Accounting standards, which vary greatly from
market to market, are also inadequate in the view of many inves-
tors. Then there is the corporate culture itself. Deals are often cut
behind closed doors and many firms, particularly family-owned ones,
plan to keep it that way. (Steinberger 1997, 85)
The magazine asked: “What’s wrong with the Asian research that’s
published?” The reply of a Hong Kong-based British investment expert
was sarcastic: “The quality of the paper is high . . . The colors are very
bright and the reports are very heavy. It’s what’s inside that is a prob-
lem” (ibid.). These perspectives are consistent with the local-global bi-
nary and the overall discourse on good governance that calls for the
modernization and professionalization of emerging markets, according
to “advanced” or “mature” market standards. But these are not only
“Westerners’ views”; my informants also share such representations that
locate these problems in the underdeveloped nature of the Philippine
economy, business and finance. For example, the tendency to issue fa-
vorable recommendations and resort to euphemisms is justified by the
research head of a foreign house. He says Filipino corporations are still
sensitive to negative analyses.
A former analyst for a rival foreign house makes a similar point:
“Many companies are not yet professionally run. A sell article is viewed
as a ‘sell’ on the owners instead of a ‘sell’ on the quality of the com-
pany” (emphasis added). Their statements imply that this tension is less
pronounced in advanced markets where corporations and their manag-
ers are purportedly more professional and objective and less likely to
take analysts’ recommendations personally. Likewise, the absence or po-
rous nature of the “Chinese walls” (which should separate investment
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banking from brokerage research, according to advanced market stan-
dards) is articulated with the underdeveloped Philippine securities indus-
try, where norms and regulations governing conflicts of  interest are not
well-established, where there are no internal compliance officers, or
where such personnel, if  they exist, have vague roles.
Finally, the lack of  originality and overall poor quality of  securities
research in the Philippines is articulated with the “youth” and “lack of
seasoning” of the local analysts, most of whom joined the industry in
the mid-1990s, when the sudden infusion of portfolio capital and entry
of new investment houses created a huge demand for brokerage ana-
lysts. The earlier cited Euromoney article has observed: “More often than
not the research is done by twenty-somethings with minimal experience
and limited skills . . . The dearth of experience breeds lemming-like
behavior” (ibid., 86). It quoted a U.S.-trained analyst based in Hong
Kong: “There is a bandwagon mentality out here . . . For a young
analyst with maybe a year’s experience, it’s very tough to stick your
neck out and go against the prevailing wisdom” (ibid.). But again, these
representations are shared by my local informants. An investor relations
officer whom I interviewed even cites a pejorative term commonly
used in the industry to refer to young analysts: “JASS (junior analysts
[who are] saying something).” But the implication is also that, as the
Philippine stock market matures, especially as it goes through several
bull and bear cycles, as in advanced markets, and with continuing expo-
sure to the demands and practices of foreign investors and houses, the
quality of local analysts and analysis will also improve.
Finance Literature on Securities Research
in the United States
What is often overlooked in the “young/emerging” vs. “mature/ad-
vanced” market binary is the fact that the finance literature in the U.S.
(academic, practitioner, and popular) has made the same kind of obser-
vations about the tensions, conflicts, and dilemmas in sell-side securities
research in the U.S. and other developed equities markets.
A former executive of  the International Finance Corporation, the
World Bank’s private sector arm, who has had broad experience
evaluating securities in advanced and emerging markets as a fund man-
ager and investment banker, has this to say about Wall Street securities
research:
[B]rokerage research reports are a good resource. They contain
basic information and provide financial projections, along with a rea-
sonably cogent rationale for buying or selling a specific stock. The
industry knowledge displayed in these reports is generally impressive,
and the authors demonstrate, in many cases, a keen understanding
of  the potential pitfalls awaiting a business. Nevertheless, in reading
this material, the serious investor must be aware of the sell-side
analyst’s nettlesome proclivities: (1) to generate commissions for his
employer; (2) to protect his employer’s investment banking business
by withholding sell recommendations; (3) to cover his backside with
vague recommendations that cannot be definitively linked to a result;
and (4) to avoid being left alone, especially when the consensus is
recommending something else. Such advice, to say the least, is
hardly disinterested, but the analyst’s financial review can be insight-
ful and semiobjective. No matter, much of the sell-side research is
said today and forgotten tomorrow. That part that remains a perma-
nent record is usually too hedged with reservations to pin down the
analyst’s record in picking winners. (Hooke 1998, 61)
There is, in fact, a body of empirical studies in the field of finance
that investigates how the very work environment of securities analysts
in the U.S. puts them in the middle of  conflicts of  interest pressures,
leading to less than objective forecasts and analyses of companies and
stock recommendations. Researchers have documented analyst over-
optimism and described incentives that lead to this tendency (Carleton,
Chen, and Steiner 1998). Some have found that analysts tend to issue
favorable reports to cultivate good relations with corporate manage-
ment who provide them with company-specific information necessary
for their analyses (Francis and Philbrick 1993; Das, Levine, and
Sivaramakrishnan 1998). Others have studied the influence of invest-
ment banking and underwriting relations on analyst recommendations
and noted that analysts employed by houses that have investment bank-
ing relationships with a company issue more favorable stock market
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recommendations for that company than unaffiliated analysts (Dugar
and Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack
1999). Because analysts are driven to maximize trading commissions,
they also tend to initiate coverage and gather information on stocks that
they expect to perform well, since trading volume on a poorly per-
forming stock is limited to the investor’s initial holdings of  that stock
(McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Hayes 1998). There is also research that
shows analysts exhibiting herding behavior, whereby they issue forecasts
similar to those previously announced by other analysts even when this
is not justified by their information. They engage in such practices to
reduce the downside risks of  unique opinions and preserve positive
investor perceptions of  their relative forecasting abilities (Trueman 1994;
Cote and Goldstein 1999).
The popular and practitioner finance media that regularly cover the
activities and views of  Wall Street actors and institutions likewise pro-
vide plenty of anecdotal evidence of how securities analysts find them-
selves in the very center of  the conflicting interests and struggles that
characterize the contemporary full service financial conglomerate. For-
tune magazine cited one analyst as saying: “An analyst’s job today is to
keep all his constituents happy,” then quickly added:
That’s no mean feat, since these constituents—the sales force at his
firm, the buy-side clients, the companies he follows, and (not least)
the firm’s investment bankers—all have differing motives. The only
thing they have in common is that they want stock prices to go up.
(Nocera 1997, 85)
A crucial space of  position-taking and struggle in the field involves
the relations between research analysts and the companies that are the
subjects of  their analysis. In the context of  a dominant financial dis-
course of “promoting shareholder value” and given the analysts’ clout
with institutional investors, companies have also sought to control at-
tempts to put them under critical financial scrutiny with their own strat-
egies to manage information and with efforts to exercise their own
form of  sanctioning power. For example, in recent years, the corporate
position of director or manager of “investor relations” has been cre-
ated and has taken on increasing importance as companies seek to give
“guidance” to the research analysts who monitor them regularly.
According to the Fortune article, “guidance is one of  those odd Wall
Street conventions that may make perfect sense to an insider but seem
a little nuts to anyone not steeped in the culture of the Street” (ibid.,
80). What it means is that during quarterly conference calls with analysts,
designated company spokespersons “give a vague set of projections
designed to help analysts come up with their earnings estimates for the
next quarter” (ibid.). While analysts usually press for more information,
they usually do not get them, which indicates that the investor relations
manager is doing a good job. The Fortune article said “guidance” has
become the primary form of  communication between companies and
analysts for a number of reasons:
It keeps the playing field even which the SEC demands. It helps
prevent lawsuits. And it helps keep analysts’ estimates within a fairly
narrow range—which, in turn, helps keep the consensus where the
company wants it. What guidance doesn’t do, though, is tell the ana-
lysts much about what’s going on inside the company. (Ibid., 80–81)
But sometimes, corporations simply hire additional investor relations
managers to provide “guidance” directly to the institutional investors to
undercut the mediating role and power of  analysts.
Moreover, corporations do retain considerable power of sanction
over the analysts who monitor them. For example, Institutional Investor
reported a survey it made of  members of  its “All-America Research
Team” which showed no less than 61 percent of  the respondents say-
ing that they have been pressured to moderate negative reports at least
once in their careers, with the threats coming in the form of  losing
access to the offended company, a discontinuation of  investment bank-
ing business with the analyst’s house, a potential lawsuit, and even of
getting fired (Galant 1990). A recent Wall Street Journal article described
similar forms of  “retribution” for negative ratings: “Analysts are ex-
cluded from meetings, outings and conference calls with top company
executives. Analysts’ firms are put in the ‘penalty box’—that is, bounced
from trading and underwriting deals for a period of time” (Siconolfi
1995). A Forbes magazine article, “See no Evil, Speak no Evil,” re-
ported on the deterioration and lack of  independence of  Wall Street
35
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research. It quoted a fund manager thus: “Analysts have become re-
porters for the company. If  management says everything’s okay,
everything’s okay” (Morgenson 1997).
The reason given for this lack of independence is that positive re-
search reports often make a difference in whether an investment bank
gets lead underwriter status or whether it participates in any corporate
underwriting projects at all. Moreover, the Forbes article said that ana-
lysts’ compensation has increasingly come from investment banking rev-
enues. Note that corporate finance typically accounts for four times
more of investment bank revenues than equity sales commissions (see
Hayward and Boeker 1998). Because analysts know companies inside-
out, they know which companies are considering an initial public offer-
ing, in need of  additional financing, or exploring mergers. In turn,
companies which are thinking of these options are likely to get in touch
with analysts as their first point of contact with the investment bank.
Analysts also provide implicit (sometimes explicit) assurance, depend-
ing on how good their reputations are in the market, that any prospec-
tive stock offerings that the house supports will have a ready and wide
audience among big institutional investors. “The primary function of
research analysts at top investment banking houses is to promote the
firm’s investment banking product,” a Wall Street Journal article quoted
a securities industry veteran. But its author qualified: “Rigorous research
isn’t always conducive to snaring investment banking work” (Raghavan
1997).
What is critical for investment banking clients, however, is for ana-
lysts on the full service firm’s brokerage side to have clout and loyal
following among the big investors that allow them to influence invest-
ment decisions and eventually stock prices.
When a company is choosing a firm to take it public, it is also
choosing an analyst who will follow the stock once it is listed. It
wants a respected analyst, one who will have credibility when he
begins his coverage (as he must) with a “buy” recommendation.
This, obviously, gives the analyst the power to nix any investment
banking deal. But it also means that analysts are sometimes tempted
(or pressured) to recommend shaky companies so the firm can reap
lucrative investment banking fees. (Nocera 1997, 86)
As an associate director of  research at a Wall Street brokerage has
told Fortune magazine: “The fact that XYZ Co. makes a certain number
of widgets a year in a plant is utterly useless unless it affects an opin-
ion on a stock” (Fisher 1984).
At the same time, however, the domination of the market by mu-
tual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors actually in-
creases the power of  top-ranked analysts from well-known full service
houses. “Now, if  they can land an order from, say, Fidelity, they can
move the market with a single sale” (Morgenson 1997). As many of
my informants have also noted, it is often difficult to distinguish be-
tween “analytical power” and “placing power.” Analysts from big
houses have the backing of their sales force and their own investment
funds. Their recommendations therefore have a self-fulfilling quality
which further serves to enhance the reputations and rankings of  the
analysts and their houses. These high survey ratings only increase their
“placing power” even more. A managing director of a foreign house,
for example, recalls how his client list jumped from 200 to 2,000 when
he moved from the research department of a mid-sized Asian house
to a big European house. He quotes a top executive of a British house
as saying: “Whoever you put there, even if you put monkeys, it will
operate. The house will deliver commissions because of its brand recall
and product line.”
Conclusion
The representations of the Philippine stock market and securities re-
search and their articulations with broader discourses of
professionalization, development, and governance serve as windows to
understand processes of global financial governance. Governance can
be understood not simply in the narrow sense of the promulgation by
official public agencies and other organizations of codified rules, incen-
tives, principles, and procedures that aim to constrain or regulate
economic behavior. In the broad sense of  steering or guiding conduct,
governance need not be based on formal statutory authority or govern-
ment (Rosenau 1992). Thus, it can be viewed as regularization: the
production of socially-shared and increasingly taken-for-granted political-
economic meanings, identities, and hierarchies.
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Notes
This essay is part of  the author’s larger book project titled, Calling to Account: Cor-
porate Governance, Global Financial Regularization and the Symbolic Labor of Securities
Research, to be published by the Ateneo de Manila University Press.
1. Institutional Investor started naming its annual “All-Asia Research Team” in
April 1994. Asiamoney began publishing its yearly poll of  Asia’s best stockbrokers,
with separate categories for research, sales, and execution, in October 1990.
2. In Filipino, this phrase is pronounced the same way as “Dow Theory;” the
use of daw in conversation roughly means “someone said” or “I heard” and im-
plies hearsay.
3. This phrase is almost identical to what a Filipino informant called “Daw
Theory” to describe the stock market practices of local investors. But the state-
ment “I think it’s going up,” comes from an expat head of  research of  a foreign
house, and is being relayed to global fund managers.
4. I will not cite the specific issue of the Institutional Investor to conceal the re-
search analyst’s identity.
5. Such characterizations of financial markets and actors that deviate from the
dominant discourse have had a long history. Griffith-Jones (1998) builds on the
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This most pervasive of  all sorts of  governance emerges as if  from
the bottom up . . . from altering horizons of identification in pat-
terns of  “global life” . . . [It] suggests that globalization is not just
extensive, forming interconnections across space, but also intensive,
reaching into the level of personal conduct. (Hewson and Sinclair
1999, 6–7)
What gives global governance particular efficacy and legitimacy is its
presumed neutral, apolitical and natural quality.
 This essay has argued, however, that financial regularization is not
fully achieved or complete. Securities actors themselves negotiate and
struggle with the representations, articulations and identifications in their
field. Thus, the fixing of meanings and subjectivities in the discourses
of the stock market and of securities research is only partial and un-
stable. These representations and the identities and interests that are
privileged in their articulations are permeated with conflicts and contra-
dictions. In the case of  securities research, I have noted the tension in
the way the practice is both privileged and subordinated vis-à-vis
marketing and profit-making. Professional expertise and independence
are valued but also subjected to the bottom line of revenue-generation.
Such tensions in the stock market field and securities research, in
particular, point to the contradictory dynamics of global financial
regularization.
Securities analysts, as examples of finance professionals, occupy the
contradictory position of “dominated dominant” symbolic laborers—
as both objects and subjects of financial power, whether in emerging
or developed markets. They are producers and legitimators of  the dis-
cursively constructed hierarchies, but also potential agents for “leveling
the playing field” because of their identification with discourses and
practices of  transparency, accountability, and professionalization. This
tension is a crucial analytic point because it goes to the heart of the
instability and contradictions of the discourse of “good governance”
and the process of global financial regularization, and the conditions of
possibility for their contestation and reconstitution.
Accounts of both “sell-side” and “buy-side” practices in the stock
market are not completely subsumed in the dominant discourse, and
such representations find support in alternative narratives of the field
that are made even with respect to the U.S. stock market, as has now
become plain in the wake of  the scandals. Thus, they open up discur-
sive and political spaces for challenges and rearticulations. Alternative
discourses coexist and overlap with the prevailing and dominant dis-
courses that articulate events, practices, meanings, and subjectivities in
different ways. For example, the discourse of  “shareholder value” has
been deployed by small investors to make transparent and accountable
not only corporations and financial services professionals like accountants
and securities analysts but also fund managers, who are often empow-
ered to act on behalf of investors, and government regulators them-
selves whose mandate is to safeguard the public interest.
Thus, an analysis of processes of symbolic production opens us to
an understanding of the conditions for rearticulation and reregu-
larization. If “symbolic systems are social products that contribute to
making the world, that they do not simply mirror social relations but
help constitute them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by
transforming its representation” (Wacquant 1992, 14).
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